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GOD AND GOVERNMENT AT YALE: THE LIMITS OF
FEDERAL REGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Robert M. O'Neil*
When the presidents of both Harvard and Yale Universities challenge
the propriety of federal government policy toward higher education, the
entire academic community should take note. Their concerns clearly
transcend the interests of their respective institutions. In his June 1975
address to the Associated Harvard Alumni, President Derek Bok warned
that "the critical issue for the next generation is Harvard's independence
and freedom from governmental restraint." He voiced particular concern
about "the ills that might accompany any government aid that the University receives: . . . clumsy legislation, . .. stifling bureaucratic requirements, . . .- [and] erratic fluctuations" in funding.' Bok's concern was
neither abstract nor remote. Late in the afternoon before his alumni
speech, he had received a special delivery letter from the Acting Director
of the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. Harvard, along with 28 other major universities slated to get
large federal grants before the close of the fiscal year, was given less than
two weeks in which to revise its affirmative action plan or pledge to follow
a model approved by the agency.2 Bok's concern was intensified by the
fact that Harvard's affirmative action plan, unlike those of most other universities, already had been approved by the HEW regional office. The
latest letter from Washington implied a rescission-or at least a major
qualification-of that earlier approval.
The comments of Yale President Kingman Brewster came earlier in the
spring, in a less urgent context. Speaking to the Fellows of the American
Bar Foundation, Brewster warned that "there is a growing tendency for
the central government to use the spending power to prescribe educational policies." He continued: "Use of the leverage of the government
dollar, to accomplish objectives which have nothing to do with the purposes for which the dollar is given, has become dangerously fashionable."
Brewster's illustrations were taken not only from the field of affirmative
action but also from proposed health manpower legislation designed to increase the number of medical graduates going into rural and family
practice. After expressing doubts even about the constitutionality of cur* Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University
of Cincinnati. A.B., 1956; A.M., 1957; LL.B., 1961, Harvard University.
1. Harvard University Gazette, June 13, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
2. See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1975, at 48, col. 6-8; Chronicle of Higher Ed., June
23, 1975, at 1, col. 2-4.
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rent federal regulation in these areas, Brewster concluded: "High on the
agenda of the [legal] profession, especially its scholarly branch, should
be to see that in terms of both limits on authority and redress against its
abuse, the coercive power of the federal purse is made subject to a rule
of law." 3
Brewster's challenge certainly deserves a thoughtful response. No court
decisions neatly prescribe the "rule of law" which he invokes. Despite
much recent discussion about the autonomy of colleges and universities,
and their need for protection against intrusive legislation, few pertinent
precedents exist. Apart from the DartmOuth College case, 4 there are a
few lower court decisions recognizing the autonomy of colleges and
universities vis-'t-vis state legislation, but no cases clearly in point, on
Brewster's issue-the relationship between higher education and federal
regulation or control. Clearly the subject deserves careful analysis in constitutional as well as public policy terms. This article attempts a preliminary overview of the constitutional issues.
I.

GOVERNMENTAL

REGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION:

A

PROSPECTUS

Governmental regulation of higher education comes in many forms and
emanates from all levels-federal, state and local. Typically, regulation
or control is tied to funding, although that is not invariably the case.
(Until recently, for instance, Massachusetts required faculty members at
private colleges and universities to sign disclaimer-type loyalty oaths. Only
after a major test case was the oath requirement removed.-)
Many forms
of regulation are unobjectionable-for example, health, fire, and safety
regulations which usually apply alike to public and private institutions of
higher learning. Whether out of concern for academic freedom or for other
reasons, government historically has been loath to interfere in matters of
curriculum, admissions, personnel policies, and other sensitive sectors of
higher education. In fact, the extent of governmental interference in
the administration of colleges and universities has been relatively limited.6
3. Yale Alumni Magazine, April, 1975, at 34-35.
4. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).

See generally H.

FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE

(1969).
5. Pedlosky v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 352 Mass. 127, 224 N.E.2d
414 (1967).
6. A most dramatic evidence of this restraint is the largely unexercised powers of
the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, a body which dates
from colonial times. The Regents have most extensive powers over both public and
private higher education in New York state. See O'Neil, Private Universities and
Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155, 180-81 (1970). Recently there have been indications of a greater regental inclination to exercise this largely dormant power, in a
conflict with the Trustees of the State University of New York over new degree proPENUMBRA

grains at the controversial Old Westbury campus.

See N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1975,
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Recent events have begun to change rather profoundly this historically
limited relationship. Within the past decade, several forces have combined
to produce a metamorphosis. One factor, of course, is the dramatic growth
of governmental support of higher education. (Enrollments increased
sharply during the decade, to be sure, but funding grew at a much faster
rate than the size of student bodies.) A second clear cause of rising governmental regulation of higher education was the campus disorders of the
late 1960's and early 1970's, which drew the attention of legislators toward
higher education to an unprecedented degree. The enactment of much
restrictive legislation during this period leaves little doubt that student
protest was a major catalyst for government intrusion into academic life. 7
The third factor, later to develop and less easily isolated than the others,
is the growing dissatisfaction of many groups with the quality and value
of higher education.8 As the number of jobs for college graduates and the
practical value of a baccalaureate degree decline, the invitation to new
forms of government regulation is manifest.
To these three environmental factors should be added two other sorts
of pressure, one from within the academic community and the other from
without. The internal pressure has been for greater governmental support
to the private colleges and universities, many of which have been faced
with near financial crisis as a result of rising costs, dwindling enrollments,
and uncertain private support in the 1970's. From outside higher education, about the same time, has come much political pressure for greater
accountability of higher education in regard to race and sex. Even where
overt discrimination has not been practiced, women and minorities have
been dramatically underrepresented in graduate and professional student
bodies, on faculties and professional staffs. Since few institutions of higher
learning voluntarily undertook to correct the situation in the 1960's, governmental mandates for affirmative action became inevitable in the '70's.
As these factors coalesced they generated increasing government regulation. Sometimes the focus has been "accountability"-as with the spate of
conditions which the Michigan legislature attached to the appropriations for
the state's three major universities.9 Sometimes legislative control has been
designed to encourage or discourage certain forms of behavior. The
Pennsylvania law which required institutions throughout the world to
at 39, col. 4-8. In no other state, however, does a coordinating or governing board
possess even the theoretical powers of the New York Regents with respect to private
higher education. With certain recent exceptions noted below, the extent of intervention in public higher education has been less than might be expected.
7. For one evidence of such legislative concern in the late 1960's and early 1970's,
see O'Neil, Tenure Under Attack, in THE TENURE DEBATE 178-99 (B. Smith ed. 1973).
8. There is mounting evidence of "consumer protection" not only with respect to
proprietary post-secondary institutions, but across a broader field. See, e.g., Chronicle
of Higher Ed., Dec. 9, 1974, at 1, col. 2-4; National Observer, Jan. 25, 1975, at 3,
col. 1-3.
9. Mich. 1971 P.A. 122.
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report violations of either campus or civil law by Pennsylvania students
provides a graphic example. 10 Legislatures in several states have imposed
"faculty workload" conditions, ostensibly designed to ensure that professors
did what they were paid to do, although some such laws evinced a punitive
tone. Occasionally government regulation has actually touched upon curriculum-as in the case of Ohio's 1974 requirement that all state-assisted
medical schools create departments of family practice out of whole cloth
in 90 days.'1 In many states legislatures or coordinating boards have
sharply curtailed the admission of nonresident students. (Typically these
quotas apply to public institutions. As a condition of Commonwealth aid,
however, the University of Pennsylvania must admit 70 percent state residents to its Medical School and 50 percent Pennsylvanians to the Veterinary
School. 1'2 ) Finally, of course, there are the conditions and restrictions
(chiefly under federal law) designed to prevent discrimination and to en-3
hance educational or professional opportunities for minorities and women.a
Government regulation of higher education is nothing new, of course.
Even the Morrill Act 1 had its conditions, and few appropriations for
higher learning have been without some accompanying restriction or control. What has changed is not the fact of regulation, but its extent. This
change is partly the result of the increasing public focus upon higher education as a regulated sector. Meanwhile, there has also been a sharp
rise in the regulation of all institutions. Affirmative action, for example,
is as much the burden of the corporate executive's life these days as of
the university president's. Meeting the new and costly standards for
occupational safety and health is a problem which colleges and universities
share with all other large employers. Yet the growth of government regulation has hit higher education especially hard for two reasons: First,
because higher education for so long has been largely exempt from most
forms of government regulation; and second, because the special costs of
compliance cannot be passed on to a "consumer" as they can be by private
business. There is also a feeling throughout much of higher education
that the tone, if not the content, of much of the new regulation is inappropriate for the academic community. A university president or dean understandably winces at being called a "contractor," or at having a diverse and
distinguished faculty characterized as "the labor force" or at reference to
academic qualifications as "competence." ' There is also much concern
10. PA. STAT. AN-N. tit. 24, §§ 5104.1, 5158.2 (1971).
11. OIo REV. CODE § 3333.11 (Page Supp. 1974).

12. See Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 997 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
13. Most recently (and controversially) Title IX of the Higher Education Act
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 (1972), as amended Pub. L. No. 93-586 (Dec.
31, 1974). 88 Stat. 1855-86.
14. 7 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
15. See generally O'Neil, Autonomy and Mythology: The Need for Neutral Principles, in WOME-, I-, HIGHER EDUCATION 320 (P. Graham & T. Furniss eds. 1973).
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about Labor Department Wage and Hour investigators measuring entitlement to compensation on the basis of the number of contract hours taught,
regardless of discipline, course level, or professional qualification. The
whole experience of being regulated by the same standards that apply to
business and industry has been an uncomfortable one for higher education
and helps to explain some of the annoyance of Bok, Brewster and others.
These concerns are not, however, constitutional ones. They are matters
of public policy and politics. The fact that federal regulation may be
annoying, or unfamiliar, or expensive, or even insensitive to academic niceties does not make it unconstitutional. The issue to which President
Brewster has quite properly drawn the attention of legal scholars is a
constitutional one and not one of legislative judgment or policy. It is
important to identify and analyze the legal issues, elusive though they may
be.
II. Tim

CONSTITUTIONAL

DIMENSION

OF

GOVERNMENT

CONTROL

We might restate the Brewster argument as follows: Federal funding
is being used in ways that are constitutionally suspect because the goals or
objectives of current restrictions and conditions are constitutionally suspect.
There seems to be no suggestion that Congress lacks constitutional power
to appropriate funds for virtually any facet of higher education, public
or private. Although the Constitution does not specifically create any
power to aid higher education (or elementary and secondary education for
that matter), such power simply has been assumed. Recently the Supreme
Court seemingly laid to rest any lingering doubts on this issue. While
upholding the Higher Education Facilities Act, 16 the Court observed that a
law designed to aid higher education "expresses a legitimate secular objective entirely appropriate for governmental action.""
Thus the basic issue
here is not the goals or objectives for which the money may be spent, but
conditions collateral to the main purpose of the appropriation.
Restrictions and conditions on federal funding for higher education
might be challenged for any of four quite distinct reasons. First, it could
be argued that conditions are suspect because they are unrelated to or
logically remote from the program and activities supported by the appropriation-that is, Congress may not condition support for Program A on
the achievement of certain standards in unrelated, nonfunded, Program B.
16. 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-58 (1972).
17. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971). The only issue involved in
that case-and, indeed, the only possible constitutional challenge to federal support
for higher education-was based upon alleged conflict with the establishment clause of
the first amendment. Such conflicts have been exceedingly troublesome in elementary
and secondary education, and productive of much litigation which we shall discuss at 53334 infra. In higher education, however, few constitutional questions have been raised
about the propriety of the limited current forms of federal institutional support.
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Second, such conditions might be challenged because they seek to accomplish indirectly goals or objectives which the federal government may not
achieve through direct regulation-that is, they proceed through the back
door when the front door is closed. Third, conditions or restrictions may
be challenged because they compel the institution to violate the constitutional rights of students, faculty members or other individuals as a
condition of receiving federal funds. Finally, such restrictions may be
challenged because they invade the autonomy of the college or university
as an institution of higher learning, regardless of their effect on individuals.
We must examine each of these hypotheses in turn before passing a final
judgment on the constitutional claim.
A. Relationship between Funding and Regulation.
One source of President Brewster's concern is the sometimes attenuated
relationship between the program that receives the funds and the program
that is the subject of regulation. In his recent speech to the American Bar
Foundation Fellows, Brewster observed that the leverage currently asserted
by Congress and federal agencies "might be called the 'now that I have
bought the button, I have a right to design the coat' approach." He
continued:
Thus if we are to receive support for physics, let's say, we must conform
to federal policies in the admission of women to the Art School, in women's
athletic facilities and recruitment of women and minorities-not just in the
federally supported field, but throughout the University. This is constitutionally objectionable, even in the name of such a good cause as "Affirmative Action." In the legislative and in the popular mind, when the spending power is involved, there is a relaxed "anything goes" attitude toward
18
the spread of federal regulations.
This argument certainly has at least a superficial appeal. It would be
troublesome if all federal support for the nuclear reactor could be cut off
because the university did not admit enough women to the art program.
In fact, this is not an entirely fair description of the affirmative action
machinery. Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972-the
object of most of the recent outcry-provides that termination or denial of
federal funds "shall be limited in its effect to the particular education program or activity or part thereof in which noncompliance has been found." 19
18. Yale Alumni Magazine, April, 1975, at 35; Chronicle of Higher Ed., March 3,

1975, at 1, col. 2-4.
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972).

The coverage provision of the proposed Title IX

regulations may be ambiguous in this regard; it "applies to every recipient and to each

education program or activity operated by such recipient which receives or benefits
from Federal financial assistance."

40 Fed. Reg. 24139 (June 4, 1975).

There may

be some disagreement about the precise meaning of the term "benefits from" in the
coverage clause. The one case cited in an earlier portion of the proposed regulations,
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969), does
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Similar language appears in Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, basic
20
Congressional injunction against discrimination in the use of federal funds.
Thus it is not quite accurate to say that Congress has fashioned the coat
on the basis of having bought the button.
Let us assume, however, that Brewster's characterization of the appropriation-condition relationship is essentially correct. The argument that
control should extend only to the funded programs sounds logical enough at
first. There are no constitutional decisions dealing directly with the issue.
There are, however, two analogous contexts which afford some insight.
One is the group of recent cases dealing with the effect of governmental aid
to and control upon otherwise private colleges and universities-the extension
of the state action doctrine and the Bill of Rights to the private campus.
The other analogy comes from the recent cases dealing with state aid to
church-related schools and colleges.
The state action cases are especially relevant here. In the late 1960's,
federal courts began to deal with suits by students at private colleges and
universities. These suits sought to ground federal jurisdiction (and the Bill
of Rights guarantees) on governmental aid to or support of private higher
education. Plaintiffs in these cases argued by analogy to other contexts in
which courts had found otherwise private conduct to be state action
because of substantial governmental aid or involvement. At first the courts
declined to find state action, dismissing suits against even such eminent
recipients of massive public funding as Columbia, Stanford and New York
University, not to mention smaller private colleges. 21 The Columbia
decision focused upon the relationship between the action which gave rise
to the suit (dismissal of a student involved in campus protest) and the
governmental funding (most of which was for scientific research, medical
education and such public services as hospitals and health care). The
court stressed, as a principal reason for dismissing the aggrieved student's
suit, the lack of any direct connection between Columbia's governmentally
funded programs and its student discipline. 22 The decision strongly implied
that Columbia probably could not have summarily dismissed an employee
of the Harlem Hospital or a faculty member engaged in nuclear research,
though it could and did expel an undergraduate student without notice or
a hearing.
not shed sufficient light to resolve the ambiguity.

But President Brewster does not

complain of ambiguity in coverage; rather, he assumes that the coverage extends
to the entire institution on the basis of a single federal grant, and then addresses his

concerns to that construction.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1974).
21. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874
(1974); Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Crossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally O'Neil,

Private Universities and Public Law, 19

BUFFALO

L.

REV.

155 (1970).

22. Crossner v. Tnstees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 548 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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A later federal decision in New York made explicit the institutional
bifurcation implied in the Columbia case. The case involved Alfred University, a private liberal arts college which houses the State University of
New York Ceramics College and provides general education to ceramics
majors. Alfred receives about a fifth of its operating budget from the
State University, which accounts for about a quarter of the faculty and
nearly a third of the student body. The ceramics students receive Alfred
degrees, although they pay somewhat lower tuition than liberal arts students. The State University provides pro rata support for various Alfred
services, including the salary of the Dean of Students. When a group of
students sued for reinstatement after being suspended for disrupting a
ROTC ceremony, the district court dismissed the entire suit for lack of
federal jurisdiction. The court of appeals, however, split the student body
down the middle; the University, it held, was engaged in state action
vis-A-vis the ceramics students, but not with respect to the liberal arts
students.2 3 Thus students could have had wholly different constitutional
rights depending upon the particular degree program in which they had
enrolled, though they attended many of the same classes, used the same
student services and even shared a room in the residence halls. The Alfred
decision was the high water mark of the "federal rights follow government
funds" notion, although other cases in the late 1960's were generally consistent with it.
More recently, the federal courts have taken a less fragmented view of
private colleges and universities. In two Pennsylvania cases, involving
Pittsburgh 24 and Temple, 25 the courts found state action with respect to
the entire institution-though in both cases the extent of governmental
involvement is so substantial that any other outcome would have been
surprising. Even more relevant is a recent case involving the University of
Pennsylvania,26-' much more clearly "private" than either Pitt or Temple.
23. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). A later Second Circuit case raised
an interesting variant. In Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970),
the defendant institution (a small Lutheran College on Staten Island) was clearly private
and beyond the reach of the federal courts or the Bill of Rights for most purposes. But
the plaintiffs, a group of black students suspended following a demonstration, claimed
that the conduct rules under which they were disciplined had been adopted under
the mandate of state law. (In the summer of 1970 the New York legislature required
all colleges and universities in the state to file student conduct rules as a condition of
continuing eligibility for state aid.) The court remanded the case for a determination
of the extent to which legislative pressure had led to the students' suspension. Before
further proceedings could begin, the students were reinstated and the case thus became

moot. For other views of the Second Circuit, since the Alfred and Wagner cases, see
Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974);
Crafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
24. Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
25. Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
26. Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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Penn retains a completely private board and charter. Yet in recent years
a degree of interdependence between the university and the Commonwealth has brought about what the court described as a "symbiosis". Penn
now receives about 25 percent of its general funds budget from the state; it is
extensively involved with the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; its
students receive substantial loans and grants from the state; the University
itself receives funds for capital construction, research projects and enjoys
large state and local tax exemptions. In return, the Commonwealth regulates Penn's policies, mandating lower tuition for state residents and requiring the preferential admission of Pennsylvanians to certain graduate
schools. Taking all these factors into account, the district court held that
it had jurisdiction of a suit brought by a woman faculty member who
alleged discrimination in the denial of tenure.
The Penn decision is highly significant in several respects. It marks the
furthest extension of the state action doctrine to a traditionally and structurally private university. It also seems to reject the "rights follow the
funding" notion of the Columbia case. The judge did not ask, for example,
whether the particular faculty member's salary was paid by a federal grant,
or how many state-assisted students she taught, or whether her department
had contracts with the city or state. Instead, the court judged the University as a total institution and based its decision on the entire institutional-governmental nexus. Having held that Penn's conduct was state
action for this purpose, undoubtedly the same result would now follow
in other contexts such as a student dismissal case or a suit seeking access
to the campus for leafletting or picketing.
The second analogous area of constitutional precedent may be less helpful than the state action cases. Nearly every term for the past five years,
the Supreme Court has had to judge the constitutionality of state legislation
designed to aid private elementary and secondary schools. This is clearly
not the place to summarize the now highly complex state of the law on
public aid to parochial education. Suffice it to say that the Court has been
reluctant to compartmentalize or functionalize church-related schools in
differentiating between permissible and impermissible aid. The most
recent decision, Meek v. Pittenger,2 clearly reflects this integrative view.
The Court held unconstitutional under the establishment clause several
forms of state aid to parochial schools, although the aid in question was
ostensibly limited to secular instructional materials, services and activities.
In this and earlier cases the Court has rejected the notion that "teachers
in church-related schools would succeed in segregating their religious beliefs from their secular educational duties." 28 Rather, the Court has
27. 95 S. Ct. 1753 (1975).
28. Id. at 1765. See also Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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stressed the total educational mission and environment of the school,
regardless of the specific object of subvention. Even though the auxiliary
service personnel in Meek were to be on the staff of a public agency rather
than of the private school, they were "performing important educational
services in schools in which education is an integral part of the dominant
sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained." 29.
In the parochial school aid cases, the Supreme Court added a further
argument against bifurcation: If direct support were permitted, violations
of the establishment clause could be avoided only by detailed regulation
0
of duties and continuing surveillance of school programs and activities .
The Court has refused to engage in functional differentiation of parochial
schools partly because a new set of constitutional problems-threats to
freedom of worship or academic freedom-might be created in the process
of avoiding the establishment clause problem. It is wiser, the Court has
concluded, to stay out of the thicket altogether.
The relevance of the parochial school cases to the current context is not
precise. On one hand, it is true the courts have taken a more lenient
approach to church-state issues in higher education; degrees and forms of
"entanglement" that would be impermissible at the elementary-secondary
level have been allowed in higher education because of the far wider
range of institutional choice and the greater maturity of the students. 31
Yet even in higher education some courts have been reluctant to sustain
direct institutional aid to church-related colleges, even where such aid has
been legislatively earmarked for "secular" purposes. 32 Moreover, the academic freedom argument has even greater force at the college than at the
elementary-secondary level; any judicial approach that requires the fragmentation of an educational institution or its functions may well increase
the risk of governmental intrusion.
Let us now return to the first branch of the Brewster argument-that
conditions and restrictions on federal funding are constitutionally suspect
because they often reach far beyond the funded program or activity. It

29. Meek v. Pittenger, 95 S. Ct. 1753, 1766 (1975).
30. Id. at 1767. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
31. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (state aid); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971) (federal aid).
32. For the most elaborate analysis to date of constitutional issues raised by state
aid programs for nonpublic higher education, see Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 95 S. Ct. 1455 (1975); Americans
United for Separation of Church and State v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 714 (D. Tenn. 1974),
vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1943 (1975). Although the Dunn case was vacated
and remanded on May 12, 1975, in light of supervening changes in the Tennessee statute
aiding private colleges, the Roemer case remains before the Court for argument during
the 1975 Term. For a review of current state support of private higher education, see
Chronicle of Higher Ed., May 12, 1975, at 8.
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is, says Brewster, one thing to mandate affirmative action in physics (which
receives government grants) but quite another to do so in art (which
presumably gets no government support). The two constitutional analogies surely do not sustain this argument, and may in fact undermine it.
The University of Pennsylvania was held to be engaged in state action for
all purposes once the requisite degree of interdependence had been found;
an English professor as well as a hospital employee or a student in urban
planning has rights that can be asserted in the federal courts.
This holistic view of institutions also makes educational and administrative sense. It simply will not do to have one set of rights for art students
and another for physics students. Students may not select a major until well
after their matriculation, and even after making that choice may take
courses in both art and physics. Along the way they may even switch
majors. Over time, government support for physics may decline and aid
to the humanities (including art) may increase. Faculty members may
hold joint appointments partly in government-aided fields and partly in
fields supported entirely by private funds. Even where funds are restricted by a government agency or a particular donor, they aid the entire
institution and not simply the target program-if only to the extent they
release general funds for use elsewhere.
In fact, the history and status of Yale University illustrate the difficulty
of drawing neat, simple lines between what is public and private in higher
education. Yale's early history was closely intertwined with that of the
colony and later the state of Connecticut.A3 To this day, the Governor and
Lieutenant Governor of the state are fellows of Yale and thus entitled to
play a role in its governance. 34 Yale is a major recipient of federal fundsnot only in physics but in many other fields as well. In certain specialized

33. Yale's origins were anything but private, as we regard that term today. The
first building was constructed as the result of a grant of £500 from the Connecticut
(colonial) Assembly. New Haven was chosen as the site for the new college largely
because the town donated eight acres of land "at the end of the town"-far more than

needed for the original campus.

In the 1780's, when enrollment was still under 300

students, the charter was amended to provide that the Governor, Lieutenant Governor
and six state senators would sit as trustees on the Yale Corporation, in return for
"substantial financial assistance."

Later the senators were replaced by alumni designiees;

the two state officials remained on the Corporation, however, as reminders of the role
of state government in Yale's formative years.
R.A. HOLDEN, YALE: A PICTORIAL
(1967).
34. See Note, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of University
Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1383-84 (1963), for comment on the significance of
this and other interrelationships. There is at least one other formally private university
whose governing board includes public officials; the Governor of Louisiana, the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Mayor of New Orleans are members of
the Tulane University Board, reflecting that institution's essentially public origin as the
University of Louisiana. See Guillroy v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp.
855, 861 (E.D. La. 1962).
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academic fields, Yale is the only institution in the state which provides
graduate education. Yale degrees in many professional areas meet a prerequisite to certification or licensing. Throughout the university's history
its relationship with the city of New Haven has been extremely closeas witnesses the perilous weekend in May, 1970, just before the Kent State
tragedy, when city and university officials worked in closest harmony to
avert disaster. 35 Thus there is something anomalous about the suggestion
that federal funding may require affirmative action in some parts of the
University but not in others.
B. Direct and Indirect Objectives
A second possible premise of President Brewster's argument is that
government may not use conditioned funding to accomplish objectives it
may not accomplish through direct regulation. One passage in the American Bar Foundation speech suggests such a view:
Were it not for the federal financial support, it would be hard to find warrant in the Constitution for federal regulation of medical school curricula.
Even more dubious is the constitutionality of requiring a school to draft
some of its graduates, by lottery or otherwise, to serve involuntarily, in
places not of their choice. 36
Again, as with the first argument, there is certainly a superficial appeal.
What the government cannot constitutionally accomplish directly, the argument runs, it should not be able to accomplish indirectly by the use of
the funding power. The carrot, in other words, should be no longer than
the stick.
Only one Supreme Court decision really approaches this issue, and from
a quite different perspective. Nearly forty years ago, in United States v.
Butler,3 7 the Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act. By a
35. For a graphic account of that weekend in New Haven, see Jones, Diary of a
Tense Night at a Yale "Command Post," Chronicle of Higher Ed., May 11, 1970, at

1, col. 1-4. The communication between university and city officials was frequent and
essential to the preservation of order during days and nights when Kent State University
and other campuses were heading for chaos. See also R. O'NEIL, J. MORRIS, & R.
MACK, No HEROES, No VILLAINS 50-51 (1972).
36. Yale Alumni Magazine, April 1975, at 35. The reference is to a provision of
health manpower legislation which passed both houses of Congress in 1974 but did not
survive conference and thus never became law. It would have denied capitation grants
to medical schools which failed to increase sufficiently the proportion of their graduates
going into rural and family practice. A year later, Congress tried an alternative approach to the same end; the new bill (adopted by the House of Representatives on
July 11, 1975) would require individual medical graduates to pay back $2000 to the
United States if they refused to serve at least a year in an area of short medical supply.
Cincinnati Post, July 12, 1975, at 12, col. 4-6. Although the funds to be "repaid" go
to the institution, the obligation of repayment falls on the individual under this new
approach.
37. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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6-3 margin (Justices Stone, Cardozo and Brandeis dissenting), the Court
held the statute unconstitutional. because it sought to use federal support
to "purchase" the commitment of farmers to federal regulation in violation
of powers reserved to the States under the tenth amendment. Several
passages in the opinion seem to imply that the federal power to induce
behavior may be coextensive with the direct regulatory power. That is
not, however, the holding of the case. Even if it were the holding, the
constitutional evolution of the past four decades would surely require
qualification.
In fact, the Butler Court was careful to articulate the direct-indirect
power relationship with somewhat greater care. Toward the end of the
majority opinion there appears an important illustration of the scope of
the holding. The analogy is drawn, by a curious coincidence, to the precise field with which we are here concerned-federal aid to education:
There is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions on
which moneys shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption
of a contractual obligation to submit to regulation which could otherwise
not be enforced. Many examples pointing the distinction might be cited.
We are referred to appropriations in aid of education, and it is said that
no one has doubted the power of Congress to stipulate the sort of education
for which the money shall be expended. But an appropriation to an educational institution which by its terms is to become available only if the
beneficiary enters into a contract to teach doctrines subversive of the Constitution is clearly bad. An affirmance of the authority of Congress so to
condition the expenditure of an appropriation would tend to nullify all
constitutional limitations upon legislative power. 8s
The italicized language is critical. "Teaching doctrines subversive of the
Constitution" is considerably narrower than "taking action which Congress
cannot compel through regulation." Thus what the Court said in Butler is
not that Congress may not use federal aid to induce conduct by educational
institutions which it could not directly compel-but rather that it could
not induce independently unconstitutional conduct by institutional recipients.
Quite apart from Butler, the argument proves too much. If it were the
law that Congress could not condition benefits upon conduct that cannot
be directly compelled, many well accepted programs would be in jeopardy.
For example, during the 1960's Congress adopted a provision under which
National Defense Education Act loans would be "forgiven" for teaching in
an inner city school.39 Quite clearly Congress has no power to conscript
education school graduates to teach in particular locations. Yet it has
never been seriously suggested that the NDEA forgiveness provision is
unconstitutional for that reason-or that similar loan provisions for medical
students founder on the lack of direct coercive or conscriptive power. The
38. Id. at 73-74 (emphasis added).
39. 20 U.S.C. § 425(b)(3) (1970).
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absence of direct regulatory authority may raise suspicions, of course, but
that fact alone cannot be dispositive. 40 Even to the Butler Court the issue
was not so simple, and surely it is no simpler today than it was in 1936.

C. Invasion of Individual Rights
A third and more plausible premise of the Brewster argument is that
government may not use conditioned funding to violate individual rights
or liberties. It is now settled beyond doubt that conditions may not be
attached to government benefits (or offers of benefits) which ask individuals to relinquish their rights as a condition of eligibility. The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has become deeply embedded into our constitutional law; we have come full circle from the time when Justice Holmes
suggested a policeman must choose between his job and his right to speak
freely. 41 Loyalty oaths, restrictions on political activity, invasions of privacy and countless other intrusions have been struck down because they
forced individuals to choose between a government benefit and a right of
42
citizenship.
The issue here is, however, a slightly different one. It is the extent to
which government may condition aid to institutions (such as colleges and
universities) upon their willingness to infringe the rights of individuals.
In order to put this newer issue in focus, let us consider four possible
situations that would clearly pose the problem. Suppose, for example, that
the final regulations issued under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 had forbidden sex discrimination in textbooks and curricula. And
suppose further that the regulations required institutions receiving federal
funds to take positive steps to eliminate "sexism" in instructional materials
and course content. If a college or university then terminated the appointment of a faculty member who refused to stop using a "sexist" text, or
refused to make his class discussion more sympathetic to the status of
women, a rather clear constitutional violation would be present. Presumably the first amendment gives a college professor a right to be a
sexist-that is, to make disparaging comments about women in his classes
or to assign male-dominated reading materials. (If he discriminates against
women in grading, or excludes them from his course, that is quite a different matter.) Not only would the college have violated the academic free40. See generally R. O'NEIL, THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCY: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
51-52 (1970).
41. For discussion of unconstitutional conditions and individual rights, see generally
French, UnconstitutionalConditions: An Analysis, 50 CEO. L.J. 234 (1961); Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
42. E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958).
WELFARE STATE
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dom of the faculty member by imposing sanctions on such grounds, in
addition, and more importantly for our purposes, the federal regulation
requiring such a sanction would itself be unconstitutional for compelling
conduct by the beneficiary in violation of an individual's constitutional
rights. Here, at least, the impact of Butler would be clear: If government
may not force a school or college to teach "doctrines subversive of the
Constitution" as a condition of funding, it may not force the institution to
adopt personnel policies "subversive of the Constitution." 43
A second example is suggested by one of President Brewster's targets.
During the last session Congress approved health manpower legislation
which would have withdrawn capitation funding from medical schools that
failed to increase the number of their graduates practicing in neglected
areas such as urban ghettoes and small towns. Had such a condition
become law, problems surely would have arisen. Medical schools might
of course have complied without violating the rights of students-by recruiting more minority and rural students who might return to practice in
the communities from which they came, or by offering special internship
opportunities for graduates electing inner city or rural practice, or by
stressing family and community practice in the curriculum. Such methods
might have fallen short of the mark, however; as Brewster implied, it
might have become necessary to coerce geographical and professional
choices on the part of some medical graduates in order to meet the federal
requirement. Were that the only way in which the condition could be met
and capitation eligibility retained, a serious constitutional issue would arise.
Such an institutional response, like firing sexist faculty members, would be
"subversive of the Constitution" within the meaning of Butler.
A third example also comes from the health field. Suppose the National
Institutes of Health decided to require all hospitals and medical centers to
perform abortions on demand within the first three months of pregnancy
as a condition of receiving federal funds. 44 For most recipient institutions,
43. Significantly, the once-considered textbook and curriculum provisions of the
Title IX regulations were omitted because the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare "is of the view that any specific regulatory requirement in this area raises
constitutional questions under the First Amendment." HEW believes that "local education agencies must deal with this problem in the exercise of their traditional authority
and control over curriculum and course content." Title IX QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, in
FINAL TITLE IX REGULATION IMPLEMENTING EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF

1972 (June,

1975).
44. This suggestion is not wholly hypothetical. Recently the federal Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that public hospitals in St. Louis must provide
therapeutic abortions to indigent patients. The court went on to hold that the method
of staffing the obstetrics-gynecology clinic of the city hospital with students and faculty
of the Jesuit St. Louis University Medical School resulted in an unconstitutional denial
of equal protection to indigent women wishing to exercise their rights granted by the
Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975).
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such a requirement would probably pose no serious problems. But one
can imagine a medical center with a largely Catholic obstetrical staff. If
that staff declined to perform abortions, the hospital administration probably would be forced to dismiss at least some staff members--or at least
refuse to hire any more Catholics in the future. Here, too, the federal
condition would become unconstitutional if the only avenue of compliance
involved the abridgement of individual rights of conscience and worship.
Butler, once again, would clearly apply.
A final example is a bit more immediate than the others. It is widely
assumed that affirmative action rules require preferential treatment of minorities and women in admissions and employment. Although federal officials have vigorously denied such assertions, institutions generally do give
some special consideration to women and minorities in initial admission
and hiring. Such consideration of sex and race seems constitutionally
permissible; while the Supreme Court refused last year to decide the preferential admission case, 45 it has consistently declined to review quota
hiring decisions of many lower federal courts. 46 But suppose a college or
university were told that it is making insufficient progress toward meeting
its affirmative action goals and must accelerate the pace-something which,
by the way, federal officials have never done. And suppose further that
the college anticipated no new openings in the targeted areas. Such a
situation would force the college to terminate an otherwise qualified male
white Anglo faculty member solely to make room for a new woman or
minority candidate. This judgment, based solely on race or sex, would
appear to violate the rights of the faculty member denied reappointmenteven though the motive be the laudable one of increasing opportunities for
previously excluded groups. Once again Butler's dictum would come into
play: Federal funding may not be used to compel institutions to violate
47
the constitutional rights and liberties of individuals.

45. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
46. E.g., Gallagher v. Carter, 406 U.S. 950, denying cert. to 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.
1972); Associated Gen. Contractors Ass'n of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 416 U.S. 957
(1974), denying cert. to 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973); Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa.
v. Hodgson, 404 U.S. 854, denying cert. to 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
47. An additional comment may be necessary to distinguish this case from the case
of preferential admission or hiring. Such decisions reflect a variety of factors and are
never based solely on the rank ordering of numerical criteria. The issue is not whether
exclusive reliance may be placed upon race or sex, but only whether race or sex may
be taken into account in view of the historic under-representation of such groups. Moreover, the initial applicant has no interest in a continuing relationship comparable to
that of the nontenured or probationary employee. Thus a decision to prefer a woman

or minority applicant at the threshold is vastly different from the decision to displace
a white male incumbent for the sole purpose of bringing in a minority or female out-

sider. See generally O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REx. 925, 940-41 (1974).
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These examples are interesting, but are all (happily) hypothetical. One
would like to have some real cases that are a bit more recent and more
closely in point than Butler. There is one such case that does at least
approach the issue. Several years ago Haverford and a group of other
colleges and universities brought suit in federal court against the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency. 48 They sought to enjoin on
constitutional grounds the statutory provisions by which colleges and universities around the world had to report any violation of campus rules and
most violations of the criminal law by students receiving Pennsylvania
scholarships and loans. Although the relationship was technically between
the individual student and the agency, the law could operate only if the institution agreed to report student transgressions. The sanction was clearly
spelled out in the law: If a college refused to promise that it would report
such information to the Agency, students attending that college would not
be able to receive Pennsylvania aid. For private colleges with high tuitions
and large numbers of Pennsylvania students, there was really no choice but
to sign the agreement.
The plaintiff's claim in the Haverford case was essentially the one we
have been considering here-that the eligibility conditions forced the
colleges and universities to violate the constitutional rights of their students.
Specifically, it was argued that the statutory provisions were vague and
might require reporting of much constitutionally protected as well as punishable conduct. It also appeared that the review procedure, triggered by
the college's report of a student transgression, might well deny due process.
The court struck down most of the statutory provisions as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and thus violative of the students' freedom of
expression. The bulk of the opinion was devoted to rather familiar first
amendment issues. The court touched only briefly on the manner in which
the Pennsylvania law invaded the student-college relationship. The
Agency had urged a distinction between public and private institutions,
since the latter were not constitutionally required to give hearings to their
students and could punish speech that would be constitutionally protected
on a public campus. The court refused to accept this distinction-partly
because it did not think the statute severable in this manner, but also because it felt the argument constitutionally unpersuasive:
Since the state cannot directly deny a student eligibility because of the
exercise of First Amendment rights . . . it cannot do so indirectly by tag-

ging that denial onto a determination by a university which is not bound
49
to respect such rights.
This discussion is somewhat cryptic, but does seem to be trying to state a
modem corollary of Butler: If Pennsylvania may not punish students
48. Haverford College v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
1971).
49. Id. at 1209.
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directly for protected expression (e.g., by expelling them from Penn State
or by terminating their financial aid on Agency initiative), neither may it
use private colleges and universities as the media for accomplishing that
result indirectly. The result is not that a state is denied the use of any
indirect means to accomplish what it cannot accomplish directly. Rather,
it is that government may not use conditions on public benefits to force °
recipients to violate the rights of others.
There is another higher education case which might have decided a
similar issue but which aborted before reaching it. In 1965 the Regents of
the University of Colorado authorized their general counsel to bring suit
in state court alleging the unconstitutionality of the loyalty oath required
of all faculty members. The Regents had two interests-first, that the law
imposed a criminal sanction on anyone who failed to enforce the law
properly; and secondly, that the law effectively required the Regents to
violate the first amendment rights of faculty members. 50 The trial court
dismissed the suit because of a Colorado doctrine that a public agency
may not challenge the constitutionality of a law under which it operates.
Before the appeal could be taken, a statewide election brought a marked
change in the politics of the Regents, and the new majority refused to
permit an appeal. Had the Colorado case gone to a higher court, we
might well have had a clearer decision on the issue now before us.
A third case comes from a quite different field, but does afford some
guidance. In the early 1960's, several California welfare departments
adopted drastic measures to detect welfare fraud. Alameda County
ordered its caseworkers to take part in "operation bedcheck", whereby they
were to conduct predawn raids on the homes of both suspect and nonsuspect welfare recipients. One Benny Max Parrish, an Oakland social
worker, refused to participate because he felt the program required him
to invade the privacy of his clients. When he was dismissed for "insubordination", Parrish brought suit for reinstatement. The Supreme Court of
California sustained his constitutional claim, holding the predawn raids
unconstitutional and then holding that Parrish could properly refuse to take
part in them. 1 The decision stopped short of a clear constitutional holding
on the issue before us. Parrish prevailed because the court defined insubordination as refusal to carry out a lawful order. Since "operation bedcheck"
was unlawful, Parrish was not guilty of insubordination. The court did
not say, as it might have, that public employment may not be conditioned
on the willingness of the employee to violate the rights of other individuals.
While strongly implied, such a precept was unnecessary to the outcome of
the Parrish case.
50. The case was fairly clear on the merits because the Colorado oath was virtually
identical to that of Washington state which had recently been struck down by the
Supreme Court in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
51. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1967).
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The guiding principle should be clear enough now, even though there
is no precisely applicable precedent. President Brewster quite properly
raises constitutional doubts about any conditions on government support
to higher education which presuppose the infringement of individual
rights and liberties. The difficulty is that we do not appear to have any
such conditions in current statutes or regulations. As we have noted, the
health manpower legislation to which Brewster pointed with alarm never
became law, and even if it had, it need not have required medical schools
to abridge unconstitutionally the career choices of their graduates. The
proposed textbook and curriculum provisions were left out of the Title IX
regulations-precisely because "any specific regulatory requirement in this
area raises questions under the First Amendment." Nor do the current
affirmative action rules compel or even condone the dismissal of white male
faculty to make room for less qualified women or minorities. 52 It is important in this highly sensitive area to deal with what is, rather than with what
might be.
D. Conditions and Institutional Rights
There is a fourth possible dimension to the Brewster argument-institutional autonomy in higher education. Even where conditions may not
force the institution to abridge individual rights or liberties, it is worth
asking whether colleges and universities themselves have interests that cannot constitutionally be violated. This is a novel and difficult issue, which
requires much more extensive treatment than it can receive here. But let
us begin the analysis with the material currently available.
Obviously colleges and universities do have constitutional rights. If
nothing else, the Dartmouth College case proved this much.5 3 But few
institutions of higher learning any longer rely on special charters of the
kind that Dartmouth College protected. In other respects, it would seem
that institutions of higher learning would have at least the constitutional
rights and liberties of corporations and other nonprofit institutions-for
example, the right to engage in interstate activity.5 4 In fact, we will soon
52. For a summary of the recent clarification of HEW Office of Civil Rights position on this issue, see Chronicle of Higher Ed., Dec. 23, 1974, at 1, col. 2-4. There
is a related and increasingly difficult issue with which the courts are just beginning to
deal-the conflict between affirmative action programs and commitments on the one
hand, and union agreements with seniority commitments on the other hand. One

federal court of appeals has held that the employer must follow the union agreement
seniority provisions rather than contrary provisions of a conciliation agreement with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.

v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
53. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
54. For an extended discussion of this issue in the context of interstate migration
by colleges and universities newly offering external degree programs away from the
main campus, see Granat et al., Legal and Other Constraints to the Development of
External Degree Programs (mimeo. 1975), at 4-22 to 4-35.
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hear much more about precisely this issue-interstate activities-in higher
education. With a few notable exceptions such as Antioch, colleges and
universities have seldom ventured beyond the boundaries of a single state.
Quite recently, as a result of the growth of external degrees and other nontraditional degree programs, some enterprising institutions have become
peripatetic. Consequently, the range of state regulation has markedly
increased-both to protect residents against marginal out-of-state programs, and to protect the local "market" for home institutions. These new
regulations will unloubtedly be challenged soon by migratory colleges.
A new concept of interstate commerce, applied to higher education, may
well emerge from these cases. At the moment, since no such cases appear
to be pending, it is enough to flag the issue.55
The concept of academic autonomy has received some limited protection
under state constitutional law. In the early 1950's, for example, the
Supreme Court of California resolved the loyalty oath controversy by holding that the University of California Regents, and not the legislature, had
the sole constitutional power to impose an oath upon the faculty. 56 At
other times the California courts have deferred to the special constitutional
status of the Regents of the University in defining the reach of general
state legislation.57 Even more clearly have the three major public universities in Michigan-the University of Michigan, Michigan .State and Wayne
State-enjoyed protection from the general law by reason of their constitutional status. As early as 1893 the Supreme Court of Michigan stayed
the hand of the legislature from attaching regulatory conditions to the
University's budget.58 In 1911 and 1924 the court looked to the state constitution in protecting Michigan State University from legislative interference.5 Most recently, a 1973 decision of the Michigan court of appeals
follows and strengthens this tradition, holding that the legislative power to
regulate internal affairs of the three universities is sharply limited by the
state constitution.6" In striking down conditions on faculty workload, tuition and fees, student conduct, use of firearms, staffing ratios, budgeting
and other matters, the court left little doubt about the governing principle:

55. There have been several skirmishes, notably between Antioch College and the
New York Board of Regents. See id. at 4-12 to 4-20.
56. Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952).
57. See generally O'Neil, Law and Higher Education in California, in PUBLIC
HIGHER EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA 191-207 (N. Smelser & G. Almond eds. 1974).
58. Weinberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 97 Mich. 246, 56 N.W. 605
(1893).
59. Board of Regents v. Auditor General, 167 Mich. 444, 132 N.W. 1037 (1911);
State Bd. of Agriculture v. State Administrative Bd., 226 Mich. 417, 197 N.W. 160
(1924).
60. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 47 Mich. App. 23, 208 N.W.2d 871
(1973).
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[T]he legislature is attempting to control the internal operations of
[..
universities by dictating how the funds appropriated may be spent by the
board of regents, governors, or trustees, as the case may be. Such control
is clearly beyond the power of the legislature. [The Michigan Constitution]
clearly vests [in the governing boards] the power to control and direct the
expenditure of their institutional funds. 6 '
Clearly the provisions of a state constitution afford no protection against
federal regulation. The constitutional universities in Michigan and California are thus no better off in regard to conditioned federal funding than
are the statutory systems in other states. The basic question remainswhether there is any federal constitutional autonomy which safeguards
institutions of higher learning against intrusive conditions and restrictions.
Several constitutional premises might aid an answer to this novel and
difficult question. First, one might look to the doctrine of academic
freedom, which has evolved out of the first amendment safeguards of
expression and association. All of the academic freedom decisions to date
have involved individual rights and liberties-to engage in political activity,
to teach freely, to join lawful if controversial groups, and the like. One
might, however, broaden the concept to the institutional level, since the
climate of academic freedom at a college or university is much more than
simply the aggregate of individual civil liberties. Perhaps a college or university should be given standing to assert its own interest in freedom from
restraint or intrusion, even where there are no direct invasions of the liberties of its faculty members and students. Clearly academic freedom involves
more than simply the teaching and research of individual faculty members.
Such vital institutional functions as the selection and counseling of students,
the promotion, reappointment and tenuring of faculty members, and deter62
mination of curriculum are essential components of academic freedom.
Individuals within the academic community cannot be free to teach and
study if the institution is not free to carry out these functions. If governmental regulation should seriously invade or disrupt these activities, even
without directly abridging the liberty of individual professors or students,
a cogent constitutional case could be made for institutional standing to
assert its autonomy.
Second, the governance systems of colleges and universities may merit
constitutional protection. Surely in the case of a state university or college, certain aspects of decisionmaking are as much beyond the reach of
federal law as are decisions internal to other branches of state government.
It is harde to ground the autonomy of private colleges and universities
on the tenth amendment-unless one looks back to the historic interdependence of private higher education and state government. Illustratively,
61. Id. at 43, 208 N.W.2d at 881.
62. See generally T. EMERSON, THE
(1970).
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Yale's quasi-public character may afford a source of protection rather than
vulnerability. Since the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Connecticut
are ex-officio Board members, their presence suggests a special relationship with the state and a possible source of immunity against intrusive
federal regulation. This theory has not yet been developed fully, much
less litigated, but deserves some attention in the current quest for safeguards. The governance of higher education clearly warrants some protection against a degree of federal interference which has not yet occurred
but which many fear may be in prospect.
Third, there are procedural rights at the institutional level. A college
or university, as much as an individual, is entitled to due process of law. 63
Benefits may not be withdrawn or terminated without notice and a hearing,
as the federal anti-discrimination laws clearly recognize. Specificity in
standards of conduct is as essential for an institution as for a private
person. Just as in the case of a person, an agency may not violate its
own rules in dealings with a college or university. 64 This latter claim
appears to underlie the University of Maryland's recent suit against the
HEW Office of Civil Rights, claiming improper interference in litigation
between the university and an aggrieved faculty member.6 5 In short,
the contours of procedural due process seem substantially the same for
institutions as for individuals-at least where sensitive interests such as
academic freedom and governance are at stake.
Finally, an institution of higher learning may assert a claim to substantive due process as a limitation on the conditioning power. Last term
in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,66 the Supreme Court struck
down mandatory maternity leave policies because they related arbitrarily
and irrationally to concededly valid personnel interests of the school
boards. Even where no clear denial of equality is present, the lack of a
rational nexus between the interest served and the means of serving it
may invalidate the restrictions. In this regard institutions should be able
to raise claims comparable to those successfully asserted in recent cases by
individuals.
While the analogy between individual and institutional interests is obviously imperfect, it must be the starting point in defining the constitutional
claims of colleges and universities faced with mounting governmental regu63. Cf. Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). This case, apparently the only one dealing with procedural due process
for institutions of higher learning affected by governmental action, involved approval
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service for attendance by nonimmigrant alien
students. The court prescribed procedures which must be followed before denying
institutional eligibility.
64. E.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
65. For an account of the filing of the Maryland suit, see Chronicle of Higher Ed.,
June 10, 1974, at 1, col. 1-3.

66. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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lation. Apart from the interest a university may have in avoiding the
deprivation of rights of others, there do appear to be independent institutional interests. At the very least a college or university is entitled to
procedural due process before being deprived of an important government
benefit such as eligibility for funds, or listing on a roster of approved
institutions. The claim to institutional academic freedom is a wholly
plausible one, though no court has gone beyond the protection of individual liberty within the academic community. The internal decisionmaking or governance systems of colleges and universities may well merit
judicial protection against intrusive governmental regulation. Finally, and
most subtly, there is the promising prospect of the concept of substantive
due process as the guarantor of a rational relationship between the asserted
government interest and the particular regulation or restriction. It will
require a substantial amount of litigation to secure any of these novel
claims; the stakes and the incentive are such, however, that we are likely
to see an increasing volume of university-initiated suits along precisely
these lines in the near future.
III. CONCLUSION
President Brewster is, then, partly right and partly wrong. He makes
a most telling point-one that needs to be heard both in Washington and
in state capitols-that limits must be set upon governmental regulation of
higher education. Colleges and universities are sensitive institutions, and
can be easily damaged, as the McCarthy era proved. On the other hand,
Brewster overstates the case when he implies that current regulation
reaches or exceeds those limits. While one may profitably debate the
wisdom of Title IX and its regulations, the health manpower legislation,
the current affirmative action programs, and many other measures, recourse
in such cases must lie through the legislatures and not through the courts.
Congress did not require medical schools to coerce their graduates into
rural or inner city practice. HEW did not ban sexist textbooks or require
curricular modification in its Title IX regulations. In fact, the very constitutional issues and limits with which we have been most concerned here
have also been recognized by those who draft legislation and administrative
codes. What they need now is better guidance, not more criticism. It is
time to stress the essential principles and values that are shared by the
regulators and those who are being regulated. The academic community
is, after all, not alone in its appreciation of constitutional limits on governmental power.
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